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enlarge the scope of such recovery, for recent cases have allowed a recovery where deceased was plaintiff's (1) daughter-in-law, *Bennett v. W. U. Tel. Co.*, 128 N. C. 103, 38 S. E. 294; (2) second cousin, *Hunter v. W. U. Tel. Co.*, 135 N. C. 458, 47 S. E. 745; (3) grandchild, *W. U. Tel. Co. v. Crocker*, 135 Ala. 492, 33 So. 45; *W. U. Tel. Co. v. Porterfield*, 84 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 850.

DEEDS—JOINDER OF INFANT HUSBAND.—The original grantor, a married woman, conveyed her separate estate and her husband did not join in the deed. Such deed was given to provide necessities for herself and child and at the time it was executed her husband was a minor. An action was brought by the heirs in trespass to try title. *Held*, that the deed was void under a statute providing merely that a deed of a married woman signed by herself and husband and properly acknowledged shall pass the title to the wife's separate property. *Zimpleman et al. v. Portwood et al.* (1908), — Tex. Civ. App. —, 107 S. W. Rep. 584.

The court reasons that the necessity for the joinder of the husband in the execution is not affected by reason of his being a minor. The infant husband has all the marital rights and the wife is entitled to the same protection and safeguards as the wife of an adult. In *Tippett v. Brooks*, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 107, it was decided that a conveyance of a married woman, altho a minor, joined in by her minor husband, was valid on the ground that marriage worked an emancipation from the disability of minority. And so by inference from this case, the husband must join. This decision might be questioned, as most states hold such a conveyance voidable. *Scranton v. Stewart*, 52 Ind. 68; *Webb v. Hall*, 35 Me. 336; *Dixon v. Merritt*, 21 Minn. 196; *Card v. Patterson*, 5 Ohio St. 320; *Bool v. Mix*, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 119. However, there are statutes in some of the states providing that under certain circumstances, where it is impossible to obtain the joinder of the husband, the wife may convey as a feme sole. Thus where the husband is insane, *Hadaway v. Smith*, 71 Md. 319. Or where the husband has abandoned or separated from the wife or is a non-resident. *Knight v. Coleman*, 117 Ala. 266; *Curry v. Simpson*, 72 Vt. 232. For further discussion of the different classes of statutes reviewing joinder or assent, see 6 MICH. LAW REV. 429.

DIVORCE—TEMPORARY ALIMONY AND COUNSEL FEES—APPEAL—DECISIONS REVIEWABLE.—P. had sued D. for a divorce. During the trial, the court granted an order allowing P. temporary alimony and counsel fees, pendente lite. From this order D. appealed. On motion to dismiss this appeal, *held*, that an order allowing temporary support, or alimony and counsel fees pending the litigation is appealable. *Messervy v. Messervy* (1908), — S. C. —, 60 S. E. Rep. 692.

As to whether an order for alimony, pendente lite, is appealable, see *Hecht v. Hecht*, 28 Ark. 92, in which case the court held that since an order of this nature is discretionary with the court, it will be interfered with, only upon the clearest proof that there has been an abuse of such discretion, and where such abuse affects the rights of one of the parties he may appeal. A similar holding is found in the case of *Stiehm v. Stiehm*, 69 Minn. 461, 72 N.